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Abstract—In this paper a new method for information hiding 
in club music is introduced. The method called StegIbiza is 
based on using the music tempo as a carrier.  The tempo is 
modulated by hidden messages with a 3-value coding scheme, 
which is an adoption of Morse code for StegIbiza. The 
evaluation of the system was performed for several music 
samples (with and without StegIbiza enabled) on a selected 
group of testers who had a music background. Finally, for the 
worst case scenario, none of them could identify any 
differences in the audio with a 1% margin of changed tempo.  
Keywords: information hiding, audio steganography, musical 
steganography, club music, StegIbiza 
 
“Be free with your tempo, be free, be free. 
Surrender your ego be free, be free to yourself.” 
Queen – “Innuendo” 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Steganography seems to be a very attractive subject area 
for sharing information via the Internet around the globe 
without (if possible) any trace. Recently, major attention has 
been paid to constructing image [1] and network [2] 
steganography methods. Lately, less effort has been applied 
to audio steganography [3], so this work revisited this 
attractive area for research right now. This paper will focus 
on musical steganography, which is a part of audio 
steganography depending naturally on a melody itself and 
the musical instruments, including the voice as an 
instrument. Especially, when applying information hiding to 
music streaming services, this seems to be very promising as 
there is an almost infinite source of traffic to hide in.  
 In this paper, a brand new method of information hiding 
in club music, called StegIbiza (Steganographic Ibiza), is 
introduced. Ibiza is the third largest of the Balearic Islands 
(Spain) in the western Mediterranean Sea, near the eastern 
coast of the Iberian Peninsula. Ibiza is also one of the top 
holiday destinations in Europe that is best known for its 
nightclub based nightlife. The city has achieved worldwide 
fame as a cultural center for club music, including house and 
trance. 
The proposed method of StegIbiza (Figure 1) is based on 
the music tempo measured in beats per minute (bpm). 
Tempo means “time” in Italian and is one of the major 
parameters of mixed music by DJs (disc jockeys) in 
compositions called mashups, which are created by blending 
two or more pre-recorded songs. In blending music from two 
or more decks (i.e., CD/MP3 players), the tempo must be 
synchronized to hide the blending process.  
In StegIbiza the tempo of the music is modulated by 
hidden messages with a 3-value coding scheme, which is an 
adoption of Morse code. It allows for changes in the tempo 
that are very delicate, like +/- 1-2 bpm from the original 
tempo, which was taken as a reference to be undetectable by 
human hearing. For club music a typical reference tempo is 
100-150 bpm and usually constant for a whole mushup.  
To prove that StegIbiza is inaudible to humans, several 
music samples (with and without StegIbiza enabled) were 
prepared using a professional digital audio workstation 
(DAW) and then an evaluation was performed on a selected 
group of testers also who had a music background. 
This work was inspired partially by electrocardiography 
(ECG) steganography ([4], [5]), which was called in an IEEE 
Spectrum article, “hiding data in a heartbeat” [6]. These 
methods involve electrical signals from a heart being used to 
carry hidden data. The second source of inspiration was a 
song by Enrique Iglesias featuring Nicole Scherzinger – 
“Heartbeat” (with lyrics: “I can feel your heartbeat. 
Running through me”).  
 
 
Figure 1 StegIbiza: club music as a carrier (scores are part of 
Snap! – “Rhythm Is a Dancer”). 
The paper is structured as follows: Section II briefly 
presents the state of the art in audio steganography, including 
musical steganography. Section III contains a presentation of 
the idea of the StegIbiza method and two typical scenarios 
for preparation of steganograms: one with a DAW and one 
with manual changing of the tempo by a DJ. In Section IV 
the work describes the testing environment as a proof of 
concept and shows the results of the evaluation for these 
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scenarios. Section VI includes a discussion on the 
possibilities of detection of the proposed system. Finally, 
Section VII concludes our efforts and contains future work. 
II. STATE OF THE ART IN AUDIO STEGANOGRAPHY 
Considering that at the begin of the XVI century 
Johannes Trithemius in “Polygraphiae” [7] presented a 
method based on lyrics in “Ave Maria virgo serena” (dated 
ca. 1485) and corresponding secret tables, we can assume 
that musical steganography for exchanging hidden 
information has been known and used for at least 500 years.  
In 1665, Gaspar Schott in “Schola steganographica” [8] 
presented how to use music scores for information hiding –
each note is mapped into a letter. Based on this idea, many 
systems were introduced, sometimes known as musical 
cryptograms [9]. The most recognized was a BACH motif 
(B♭, A, C, B♮), which was used by Johann Sebastian Bach 
himself and by many other composers. These methods could 
be used as a naïve encryption system or just as a 
watermarking method sometimes to honor other composers. 
Some examples are as follows:  
• B♭, A, B, E♭ (= B, r, A, H, m, Es) for Johannes 
Brahms. 
• B, E, B, A or B, A, B, E for Béla Bartók. 
• C, A, G, E for John Cage. 
• F, E♭, C, B (= F, S, C, H) for Franz Schubert. 
• D, E♭, C, B (= D, S, C, H) for Dmitri Shostakovich. 
From the perspective of audio steganography, the major 
innovations were recording of the voice and music and then 
broadcasting them. The analogue era introduced the 
possibility of adding some noise and other signals to the 
transmission [10].  
After the transformation of the audio world from analog 
to digital, five major methods [11] of audio steganography 
were introduced: 
• Least Significant Bit coding [12]: a binary sequence 
of each sample of a digitized audio file is replaced 
with a binary equivalent of a hidden message. 
• Parity coding [13]: instead of dividing a part of a 
signal into individual samples, the parity coding 
method breaks a signal down into separate regions 
and encodes each bit from the hidden message in a 
sample region's parity bit. 
• Phase coding [14]: the phase components of sound 
are not as perceptible to the human ear as noise, so in 
this method the phase of the subsequent segments is 
then adjusted to preserve the relative phase between 
the segments. 
• Spread spectrum [14]: this is a method of spreading 
out the encoded data across the available frequencies 
as much as possible. 
• Echo hiding [15]: a hidden message can be 
embedded in audio data by introducing an echo to 
the original signal by varying three parameters of the 
echo: initial amplitude, decay rate, and offset. 
There have been some efforts on the connection between 
beats and watermarking: beat detection to combat de-
synchronization and watermark estimation [16] and 
constructing beat-based watermarks [17]. 
III. IDEA OF STEGIBIZA 
The idea of StegIbiza is based on the modulation of the 
music tempo by hidden messages. In the initial 
implementation the hidden messages were encoded with an 
adoption of Morse code (Table I). Morse code was chosen 
for two reasons: it is very popular in many communities and 
by definition is very easy to use by humans.  
TABLE I.  MORSE CODE ADOPTED FOR STEGIBIZA. 
Character Code Character Code 
a +- 1 +---- 
b -+++ 2 ++--- 
c -+-+ 3 +++-- 
d -++ 4 ++++- 
e + 5 +++++ 
f ++-+ 6 -++++ 
g --+ 7 --+++ 
h ++++ 8 ---++ 
i ++ 9 ----+ 
j +--- , --++-- 
k -+- . +-+-+- 
l +-++ : ---+++ 
m -- ; -+-+-+ 
n -+ ! -+-+-- 
o --- ? ++--++ 
p +--+ ' +----+ 
q --+- - -++++- 
r +-+ _ ++--+- 
s +++ / -++-+ 
t - ( -+--+ 
u ++- ) -+--+- 
v +++- " +-++-+ 
w +-- = -+++- 
x -++- + +-+-+ 
y -+-- & +-+++ 
z --++ @ +--+-+ 
0 ----- $ +++-++- 
 
In the adoption of Morse code for StegIbiza a “dot” is 
replaced with a “+” (a “plus” symbol) and a “dash” is left as 
it was (“–”, a “minus” symbol). A “plus” means a change in 
the tempo of +Δ bpm for a period of Φ beats, and the 
“minus” means a change of –Δ bpm for the same period of 
Φ beats. The original tempo was taken as a reference and 
corresponds to a silence (“0”, a “zero” symbol), so it creates 
a 3-value variable-length code with a comma. Other 
important information about the adopted Morse code are as 
follows: 
• A “plus” is one unit long, which corresponds to Φ 
beats. 
• A “minus” is one unit long (Φ). 
• An intra-character gap (between the “pluses” and 
“minuses” within a character) is not present. 
• The space between two letters is one unit long (Φ). 
• The space between two words is equal to two units 
(2Φ). 
An example of the use of the StegIbiza method for Φ = 1 
beat and Δ =1 bpm with a hidden message containing “a” 
(+-) is presented in Figure 2. 
Now, it is possible to formulate the following research 
questions: what should be (Φ, Δ) to give a change in the 
tempo that is inaudible to humans? What should be the 
characteristics of the signal edge? 
 
 
Figure 2 Explanation of StegIbiza method (Φ = 1 beat, Δ =1 
bpm) – hidden message: “a” (two symbols: “+” and “-”). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Tempo slider (on the right) in a DJ controller 
(Pioneer DDJ-SX2). 
Now consider two scenarios of preparing steganograms 
(off-line and on-line) that would help to initially answer 
these questions. In both scenarios a streaming music service 
could transfer steganograms around the world (!). It could 
be on-demand or a classical Internet service available on 
many existing broadcasting platforms.  
In an off-line scenario, make mashups and, based on a 
DAW, tune the desired tempo with no limits over the shape 
of the signal edge (could be rectangular) and (Φ, Δ).  
In an on-line scenario, use a DJ controller (a device used 
to help DJs mix music) with a tempo slider (Figure 3). 
Typically there are also no limits to the level of the tempo 
(Δ), but the signal shape as well as the minimal duration of 
Φ depends on the manual skills of the DJ. In this, a DJ will 
be a contemporary telegrapher with a DJ controller as the 
telegraph. 
IV. PROOF OF CONCEPT AND EVALUATION 
For the proof of concept this work used a professional 
DAW: Logic X Pro by Apple. The latest version (10.2.4) 
was run with all available extensions on an Apple OS X El 
Capitan (10.11.6) machine with a 2.8 GHz Intel Core i5 
processor, 8 GB 1600 MHz DDR3 of RAM, and an Intel 
Iris 1536 MB graphic card. 
Based on MIDI (Musical Instrument Digital Interface) 
files this work prepared five covers of popular songs with a 
constant tempo: 
•  “Lily was here” by David A. Stewart and Candy 
Dulfer (131 bpm). 
• “Miracle” by Queen (92 bpm). 
• “Rhythm is a dancer” by Snap! (130 bpm). 
• “So what” by Miles Davis (120 bpm). 
• “You were the heart's beat” (in Polish: “Byłaś serca 
biciem”) by Andrzej Zaucha (100 bpm). 
All original covers were prepared without any vocal parts 
and arranged in techno, hip-hop, or trance styles with the 
instruments available in Logic X Pro.  
The chosen hidden message was “steganography is a 
dancer!”, which when encoded into a Morse code looks 
like: 
 
... - . --. .- -. --- --. .-. .- .--. .... -.--       
.. ...       .-       -.. .- -. -.-. . .-. -.-.-- 
 
and then adopted to the StegIbiza (Figure 4) containing 88 
symbols: 
 
+++0-0+0--+0+-0-+0---0--+0+-+0+-0+--+0++++0-+--
00++0+++00+-00-++0+-0-+0-+-+0+0+-+0-+-+-- 
 
The evaluation of the first scenario was for Δ∈{0.5, 1, 
1.5, 2, 2.5, 3} bpm with a rectangular shape and constant Φ 
= 1 beat. This work embedded a hidden massage to random 
parts of each song (twice) so there were 60 tracks for 
evaluation. All of them were at the highest quality and 
uncompressed. 
The group of testers (n=20) consisted of 11 women and 9 
men. They were aged 25-45 and did not have any hearing 
impairments. Seven of them had a professional music 
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background (graduated from musical school) and three of 
them worked as professional musicians. For any Δ that 
gives a 1% difference in tempo (counted as Δ/X, where X is 
the original tempo, Figure 2) – none of them could identify 
a difference in the audio. For above 1% but below 2%, only 
the professional musicians could identify the differences. 
Above 2%, around 50% (9) of the participants found 
differences. For 3% and above, all of the participants 
detected the StegIbiza. In the experiment, all the participants 
used Hi-Fi professional headphones (they could choose 
from three types from two vendors: two Sennheiser devices 
and one from Bose). After passing a blind test with the 
StegIbiza enabled, the location of the hidden message was 
shown to them. Even in this case they did not claim to be 
able to hear any differences. The selected tests were 
repeated with compressed audio files (MPEG-4 Audio 
Layer 128 kBit/s and 256 kBit/s, and there was no change in 
the results). 
 
 
 
Figure 4 StegIbiza method (Φ = 1 beat, Δ = 1 bpm) – hidden 
message: “steganography is a dancer!”. 
The evaluation for the second scenario was made during 
a summer open air party. The group of testers (n=134) 
consisted of 69 women and 65 men. They were aged 18-43 
with no information about any hearing impairments. For this 
evaluation the work used only a tempo slider (from -8% to 
+8%, i.e., ca. -5 < Δ < +5) in a DJ controller (Pioneer DDJ-
SX2 with Serato software) for regular MP3 files with top 
club music remixes. It was tested for Φ=3 and more with 
linear characteristics. The environment (echo, DJ effects) 
had a tremendous impact on the audience and the following 
results were obtained: below 2% nobody identified any 
differences in tempo. Above 2% but below 3%, around ¼ of 
the participants identified differences. Above 3% but below 
4%, around ½ of the participants identified differences. At 
this level the experiment was stopped, because the rest of 
the party did not care about the music. 
V. DISCUSSION 
This paper is a report on work in progress rather than a 
publication of final results, so there will now be a discussion 
in this section about some issues concerning assumptions 
and the security of the proposed system. 
 For the first scenario, Φ = 1 as a logical starting point – 
size of one beat - as smaller values are not interesting for 
evaluation. One beat is a solid part of a rhythm and better 
results than with Φ < 1 were not expected. For the second 
scenario, Φ = 3 as that was the limit of the DJ’s skills and it 
could not be made quicker. However, a larger Φ means less 
speed, but it should be more inaudible.  
The “Δ” parameter is mainly linked with the environment 
for the reception of the club music. For evaluation of the 
first scenario, professional headphones and high quality 
source signals were used, so for a regular audience the 
results should be better (more than 1% margin of changed 
tempo).  
This work presents two scenarios for the preparation of 
the steganograms, but one can imagine developing separate 
software to implement the StegIbiza method. It could be 
done in two ways: by usage of a DAW’s API (Application 
Programming Interface), for example, through plug-in 
interfaces, or by writing specialized software (with some 
existing audio libraries like Aubio [18]).  
StegIbiza could be detected automatically by algorithms 
for beat detection as a part of the music information 
retrieval. There are special annual contest for this type of 
algorithm, for example, MIREX (Music Information 
Retrieval Evaluation eXchange – [19]). Many of these 
algorithms are based on a Fourier transformation to find 
peaks in the spectrum of the signal and then to perform a 
deeper analysis of the sonograms that were made ([20], 
[21]).  
In [22], I presented with my colleagues a classification of 
steganography methods with three levels of undetectability, 
named: “good”, “bad”, and “ugly”. According to this 
categorization (which was formally proposed for network 
steganography, but that could be extended to all other 
methods with data in motion), StegIbiza seems to be an 
“ugly” method, as the observer is able to detect the hidden 
communication anywhere in the network, even at the 
steganographic receiver of the hidden data. However, most 
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steganographic algorithms are “ugly”, so from the 
perspective of detection and protection against these kind of 
threats, it seems to have a positive rank. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This article presented the StegIbiza method for 
information hiding in club music based on the tempo as a 
carrier. It showed how to embed hidden messages with a 
special 3-value adopted from Morse code, and then it 
presented two practical scenarios for the preparation of 
steganograms – one DAW based and one DJ controller 
based. Both scenarios were evaluated with a reference 
group, and it was found that an audience did not find any 
differences with a 1% margin of changed tempo. 
Planned future steps are as follows: 
• A dedicated tool to change the tempo in any music 
stream when using the StegIbiza method. 
• A plugin for IDS/IPS software to detect all tempo 
based threats that are similar to the proposed 
system. 
In addition, other coding schemes, than that proposed in 
this paper of a 3-value adoption of Morse code, will be 
considered. 
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